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Biniaz – After Madrid, W[h]ither the COP?

With Madrid behind us and Glasgow on the horizon, it is a good time for Parties
and others to consider the future of the annual COP. (By “COP,” I mean the climate
conference writ large, rather than the “Conference of the Parties,” the narrower technical
name for the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.) Madrid,
while a remarkably successful venue in terms of logistics, left many not only
disappointed at the Parties’ failure to reach agreement and signal an increase in ambition
but also confused:
o Why was there such a disconnect between the scientific imperative (as well as the
public outcry) and the official outcome?
o Why were the Parties unable to reach agreement, when the remit was so much
smaller than the previous year and the compromises fairly apparent?
o Did the issuance by a subset of Parties of “principles” they intend to follow have
broader significance for climate governance?
o Why was it like pulling teeth to get an important climate issue (the ocean/climate
nexus) considered by the Parties to what is supposed to be the foundational
agreement on climate change?
o Why were emerging issues (e.g., law of the sea implications of sea level rise,
carbon removal technologies) discussed only on the sidelines?
o On the whole, why did the side events seem more like the main event?
Moving forward, these and other questions are likely to be in the minds of COP
Presidents, Parties, and climate watchers as they conceptualize, and set expectations for,
future COPs.

The design of the Paris Agreement will also be relevant.

With its

implementing guidance (the “rulebook”) nearly completed, and its contributions
nationally determined, there will be much less for the Parties to negotiate. This puts a
higher premium on other aspects of COPs, particularly their ability to catalyze national
action and international support (financial, capacity-building, etc.), and may also affect
the type of government representatives that need to attend the annual conference.
In short, 2020 provides an important opportunity to imagine the features of an
ideal COP, recognize (and address, if possible) the challenges, and set out a desirable yet
workable vision.
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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IN A PERFECT WORLD
An ideal COP would serve the purposes/functions below. In the case of those that
already exist, it would serve them more effectively:
1. Action-Forcing Event
A COP would, by its very existence, be an action-forcing event. It would take
place with sufficient frequency and attention to create the necessary momentum for
Parties and other actors to do more than they would have done in the absence of such an
event.
Challenges
To a certain extent, COPs are already action-forcing events. The fact that there is a
COP every year has arguably been one of the most important aspects of the UNFCCC
regime. The prospect of a very public COP at the end of each year has played a distinct
role, to varying degrees, in Parties’ and, more recently, non-Party stakeholders’ thinking,
preparation, commitments, and actions. (Of course, in the case of recalcitrant actors, an
event is only as “action-forcing” as the actor is sensitive to attention and pressure.)
At the same time, the annual COP raises various challenges.
First, in terms of frequency, it is difficult to marshal the world’s attention and
push it to the same level every year. This does not necessarily mean that COPs should
occur less frequently, given the magnitude and urgency of the climate challenge.
However, it needs to be considered how one maintains COP momentum on an annual
basis, particularly in the face of many other calls for action-related announcements
throughout the year.
Second, there are sequencing-related challenges:
o Per the Paris outcome, Parties are to submit their NDCs many months in advance
of the next COP – potentially reducing the prospect of big NDC announcements at
COPs per se. The reason for advance submission was not to create a disconnect
with COPs, but rather to give Parties and climate observers an opportunity to
react to submitted NDCs, creating an incentive for a Party to put its best foot
forward and maybe even to adjust its initial NDC in response. If Paris works
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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properly, the Parties will have tendered their NDCs early in the year; at the same
time, a COP cannot afford to treat them as “old news.”
o Subgroups of Parties may use other venues preceding a COP (e.g., the UN, the G7,
the G20, a bilateral summit) to make ambition-related announcements, whether
related to mitigation, finance, or other climate action.
o Parties’ national processes regarding climate action may not align with a
scheduled COP.
It should be considered whether there are ways to bolster the COP’s role in
maintaining momentum on the climate issue, including how COPs can better relate to
climate action that is undertaken according to other timeframes and in other venues.
Even if a COP is not the time or venue for the coordination and announcement of action
or support, the success or failure of the COP could depend upon them.
2. Forum for Negotiations
A COP would provide an opportunity to the Parties to the Convention or the Paris
Agreement (as the case may be) to reach agreement on issues under negotiation. While,
as noted, there are likely to be fewer and fewer of such issues, there will nevertheless
continue to be a need for the Parties to take decisions of various sorts.
Challenges
COPs already afford the Parties to the Convention and Paris Agreement the
opportunity to reach agreement; taking decisions has in fact been a primary purpose of
COPs to date. At the same time, the UNFCCC’s default decision-making rule (whether
considered consensus or near-consensus1) is worth reconsidering:
o On the one hand, the need to get all, or nearly all, Parties on board could be
viewed as a strength; arriving at a decision requires taking into account the
Parties’ wide variety of viewpoints, and, once a decision is taken, a widely
supported outcome is more likely to be upheld and implemented.
1

At the close of the Cancun plenary, the United States expressed the view that the adoption of the Cancun
agreements was legitimate not because there was consensus (given the formal objection by Bolivia) but because
there is no agreed decision-making rule in the UNFCCC and the practice has been closer to “general agreement.”
Some Parties may consider that there was actually consensus, because Bolivia apparently did not reiterate its
objection after adoption of the decision; the United States (and presumably some other Parties) disagreed with the
need to repeat an objection in order to block consensus.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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o On the other hand, the procedure enables one Party (or a handful) to block or
postpone a decision on any ground; without a climate-engaged United States, it
may become even harder to reach agreement; decisions that can be agreed upon
often reflect a weak least common denominator; and widely agreed decisions are
not necessarily upheld -- Parties often re-open, explicitly or implicitly, decisions
that they agreed to reluctantly.
At this point, the benefits of consensus/near-consensus are arguably outweighed
by the growing disconnect between what is expected of the key agreements on climate
change (e.g., the ability to say that ambition needs to be enhanced, the ability to adopt
guidance on market mechanisms) and what can actually be delivered. The regime risks
losing credibility, as well as potentially pushing subsets of Parties to address issues in
their own way (e.g., the issuance by a group of Parties of the “San Jose Principles” when
the Paris Parties failed to reach agreement on Article 6 guidance).
Perhaps it is time to seriously consider other approaches, at least with respect to
some types of issues/decisions. These might include, e.g., super-majority voting (as the
GCF Board agreed to in 2019 for certain issues) or the ability of a Party to formally record
its objection/different view (akin to IPCC procedures). In this regard, it should be noted
that the Convention expressly contemplates that its rules of procedure (which also apply
under the Paris Agreement, unless the Paris Parties decided otherwise) “may include
specified majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions.” The Catch-22 here
is that decision-making rules must be agreed by consensus/near-consensus; thus, it
would require consensus/near-consensus to agree to deviate from consensus/nearconsensus.…
Short of a change in decision-making, Parties might make greater use of
declarations. These can send important signals even if they are not universally embraced
(such as the Geneva Declaration’s advancement of the Berlin Mandate).

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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3. Promotion of Party Implementation
A COP would promote Party implementation. Both because negotiated issues will
decline and because the UNFCCC/Paris goals cannot be met without serious
implementation, a COP would devote ample time and attention to these issues.
Certain mandated features of the Paris Agreement will address the extent of Party
implementation, including the transparency framework for Parties individually and the
periodic global stocktake for the Parties collectively.

Both are centerpieces of the

Agreement.
However, a COP could go beyond such mandated features to promote better
implementation. For example:
o The Paris Agreement encourages Parties to prepare and submit mid-century, lowemissions strategies. It could be helpful to Parties developing such a strategy (or
considering whether to do so) to know how other Parties went about the process
and/or whether there are expert resources to help.
o Similarly, Paris Parties are expected to increase over time the ambition of their
nationally determined contributions. Given that enhancing ambition is at the very
core of the Agreement, using the COP to help facilitate actual enhancement seems
unarguably important.
In addition, a COP could help Parties implement aspects of the Paris Agreement
that have not been specifically operationalized. For example, the Agreement sets forth as
one of its three objectives “[m]aking financial flows consistent with a pathway towards
low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (Article 2.1.c). A COP
could bring expert resources to bear on ways in which Parties could bring this objective
to life, both domestically and internationally.
Challenges
It would appear possible to have a COP focus more time on Party implementation
if the COP President made it a priority. (As noted above, it would be more challenging if
the Parties as a whole had to agree.)

The Presidency has reasonable discretion to

highlight topics of particular interest without agreement of all the Parties and can make
them a focus of the COP by setting up roundtables, panels, high-level events, etc. In
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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terms of a COP’s “value added,” if COP 25 had focused more on the pragmatic aspects of
enhancing NDCs and creating mid-century strategies, it is possible that such effort might
have been more effective in promoting ambition than the effort spent seeking to get all
Parties to agree to wording that went slightly beyond a mere repetition of past decisions.
One of the challenges here is press coverage, i.e., it has historically been difficult to
make catchy headlines out of “implementation.” Relatedly, COP Presidents are generally
Ministers, and Ministers are political beings who are likely to seek a punchier outcome.
4. Focus on Non-Party Actors
A COP would focus on implementation by non-Party actors. Given the vital role
that sub-national governments, businesses, and other non-State actors are playing with
respect to reducing emissions and taking other significant climate action, a COP would
be a venue for showcasing their accomplishments (ideally, based on rigorous
measurement and reporting akin to Paris Agreement requirements) and making future
commitments.
Challenges
In recent years, COPs have significantly increased their emphasis on the actions of
non-Party stakeholders.

Peru and France both made non-Party actor engagement a

priority, and the extensive Paris outcome on the “Action Agenda” has been increasingly
beefed up since 2015.

As sub-national action becomes a more and more essential

ingredient of successful global action and as U.S. sub-national action (at least
temporarily) stands in for U.S. national action, it should be considered whether there are
additional innovative ways to bolster their visibility and credibility, while maintaining
the primarily intergovernmental nature of the UNFCCC regime.
With respect to sub-national governments in particular:
o there might be a consolidated space (rather than diffuse pavilions) in which
leaders of sub-national governments could present on their implementation;
o access by representatives of sub-national governments (e.g., to badges, to observer
status) might be facilitated; and/or
o submissions on implementation could be captured/formalized.
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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In order to make it valuable for leaders of sub-national governments to attend and
engage at COPs, they could be invited to participate in high-level events with national
leaders/ministers to share experiences or be recognized for their leadership.
The challenges here may be fewer than for other issues; not only has there been
substantial Party support for the Action Agenda, but both a Presidency and the
Secretariat are in a position to take certain steps that do not require agreement of the
Parties as a whole.
5. Forum for Subsets of Parties
A COP would provide a forum for subsets of Parties to develop, announce, and
report on cooperative action.

This might include sectoral approaches (e.g., the key

countries with heavy cement industries developing an approach to decarbonization),
regional approaches, or other initiatives. Such efforts might be more of an official feature
than carried out in the shadows of the COP.
Challenges
COPs already provide an unofficial forum for subsets of Parties to develop
common approaches, announce various initiatives, etc.

Some groups form for the

purpose of supporting a particular negotiating position (e.g., the High Ambition
Coalition in Paris) and do not require any particular UNFCCC support. However, others
commit to specific climate actions and/or engage in cooperative endeavors (e.g., the
Climate Vulnerable Forum, Mission Innovation). Such groups currently operate on the
side, without official support or recognition.
It might be considered whether there is a way to lend greater UNFCCC support to
such groups, without compromising the situation of non-participating Parties. Among
other possibilities, a potential role for Article 7.2(c) of the UNFCCC might be considered.
It provides for the COP to “[f]acilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the
coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects….”

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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It is clear from this provision that the Convention contemplated cooperation by, and
some kind of support to, subgroups of Parties.
6. Combined Universes
An ideal COP would minimize the feeling of “parallel universes” between Party
and non-Party stakeholder events. Bringing the negotiating and non-negotiating worlds
closer together serves several important goals, including knowledge-sharing, reducing
the gap between “negotiators” and “implementers,” and reducing culture clash.
In terms of space, there would be fluidity between the negotiator and nonnegotiator areas. In terms of time, negotiators would have some freedom to attend side
events and meet with non-negotiators, whether through planned meetings or
spontaneously in hallways; these interactions can be one of the important values of a
COP.
Challenges
The challenge for a COP here is largely one of logistics. It would seem that COP
organizers should make every effort to minimize the distance between Party and nonParty stakeholder events, and both sets of events should be scheduled so as to allow for
ample cross-pollination. Madrid, for example, had a favorable layout, with negotiators
walking right through the “blue zone” (with various pavilions and side events) on their
way to negotiate. Seamless zones should be the new normal.
In addition, taking a page from the UN Climate Summit, the more a COP can
encourage multi-stakeholder coalitions (i.e., those mixing Parties and non-Party
stakeholders), the thinner the line will become between the two categories. Making space
for such coalitions would also serve other purposes (e.g., creating a forum for subsets of
Parties, focusing on non-Party stakeholder implementation, and potentially addressing
emerging issues and cross-pollination).
7. Addressing Emerging Issues

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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A COP would facilitate the ability of the Parties to discuss and, as appropriate,
address emerging climate-related issues. As one example, the IPCC report on 1.5 degrees
indicates the likely need for significant reliance on carbon dioxide removal. It would
presumably be useful to have Parties exchange views on the topic, which might include
potential ways to cooperate.
Challenges
The challenge here is, once again, that it is difficult for the Parties to agree to take
up new issues. The Madrid COP’s treatment of the ocean/climate nexus is instructive. It
was easy (i.e., a unilateral decision) for the Presidency to call the COP “blue” and include
various ocean-related events, but, notwithstanding the highly disturbing IPCC report on
the subject, it was much more challenging to get the Parties to agree for a subsidiary
body to hold a dialogue on the subject, even on a one-time basis. Many had concerns
about prejudging what might happen next, including having the issue turn into a
permanent agenda item.
Addressing new issues in the UNFCCC context undoubtedly raises challenges,
e.g., the Parties already face a crowded agenda, not all new issues are necessarily ripe for
discussion, a topic might become unduly politicized, and/or there might only be
agreement to discuss X if Y is also discussed (as in Madrid, where a dialogue on climate
and land was the quid pro quo for a dialogue on climate and the ocean). At the same
time, it would be unfortunate, both on substantive grounds and for the credibility of the
regime, if the Parties could not find mutually agreeable ways to at least discuss
important emerging issues – even if no action were taken. It is difficult to explain to the
outside world why the Parties to the key international agreements on climate change are
so resistant to discussing issues related to … climate change.
8. Cross-Pollination
A COP would promote meaningful interaction between those responsible for the
UNFCCC/Paris Agreement and those responsible for other international agreements and

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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institutions.

There is a strong substantive need for better understanding of, and

coordination/alignment among, climate-related topics:
o The ambitious Paris goals cannot be met by Paris action alone; they require help
from other places, both environmental (e.g., the Montreal Protocol) and nonenvironmental (e.g., ICAO, IMO, international financial institutions).
o As Parties increase their climate ambition over time, they may encounter
challenges in international trade or investment fora.
o Climate change has impacts on the ocean, biodiversity, etc.; at the same time, there
are potentially valuable nature-based solutions to climate change.
Ideally, a COP would operate as a two-way street, enabling both the UNFCCC
regime and other regimes to better inform their decisions and policies in light of each
other.
Challenges
In addition to facing some of the same challenges as other potential
purposes/functions (e.g., difficulty in getting the Parties to agree, limited time, etc.),
having a COP serve to help integrate various climate-related strands poses additional
ones:
o The scope of cross-cutting issues is very broad.
o International agreements/institutions have historically operated quite
independently of one another.
o Governments are not necessarily well coordinated internally on climate-related
issues.
o Even if UNFCCC/Paris Parties were to decide to use a COP to better align various
agreements/institutions, it is not clear who would represent the non-UNFCCC
ones. (Secretariats have limited ability to represent the Parties.)
If Parties were fully coordinated at the domestic level, it would promote coherence
and mutually reinforcing policies in various international venues. Barring that, a climate
COP should at, at a minimum, provide for serious informational exchanges on what is
taking place in various international fora and the impacts of UNFCCC-related decisions
on other issues (and vice versa).

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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9. Operation of Machinery
A COP would enable the machinery of the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement to operate
effectively. This would include, for example, meetings of various bodies (such as the
Standing Committee on Finance and the Warsaw International Mechanism).

The

review/accountability processes under the Paris Agreement, including the Global
Stocktake, will likely take on greater importance as negotiations recede and the need for
climate action intensifies.
Challenges
COPs have routinely included the operation of various committees, mechanisms,
reviews, etc. This function will increase as various Paris processes and mechanisms kick
in. Regarding the effectiveness of the various pieces of the UNFCCC “machinery,” the
challenge will lie in having the Parties bring to the table a combination of technical
expertise and political will.
At some point, it might be useful to consider whether there are now actually too
many bodies/overlapping functions in the UNFCCC system. Recognizing that this might
not be a high priority, and that it is always difficult to pare back institutions/functions
once established, it could be healthy for the regime to reduce redundancy and increase
efficiency, as needed. The UNFCCC expressly contemplates such consideration, calling
upon the Parties to “[p]eriodically examine … the institutional arrangements under the
Convention…” (Article 7.2(a)).
10. Positive Signals
Perhaps most importantly, the ideal COP would send a positive signal(s) to the
international community, including investors, regarding the Parties’ and other
stakeholders’ direction of travel.
Challenges
Having a COP send the right signal(s) poses more of a political challenge than a
technical one. Technically, there is no single way to send a signal; it might be the ability
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of the Parties to converge on complex rules, the commitment by a handful of major
economies to upgrade their targets, a large number of world leaders in attendance, or a
combination of outcomes.

The political challenge is much more daunting, likely

requiring (at a minimum) a concerted year-long effort by the Presidency, interested
Parties, non-Party stakeholders, and civil society.

MOVING FORWARD
Parties and others should embrace the opportunity 2020 brings to reconsider the
potential of the COP.
Of course, not all COPs can or should be alike. Each will have certain mandated
elements, and, given the limits of time, money, and attention, not everything can be a
priority. At the same time, there is room to give greater consideration to any given
COP’s value added. Particularly if COPs continue to take place annually, they will need
to evolve in some way in order to retain their relevance and ability to prompt action.
Otherwise, they are likely to unduly raise expectations – and later be branded as failures.
In this regard, future COP hosts might be selected on the basis of which one has
the most compelling vision, rather than on the basis of rotating regional groups. (There
are other reasons to move beyond regional rotation, including that some of the groupings
are outdated (e.g., much of Eastern Europe is now part of the EU); only Poland has ever
hosted for Eastern Europe; and any process that takes place every five years (such as the
Global Stocktake) will always happen in the same region.)
In any event, without some rethinking and adjustment, there is a significant risk
that COPs will render themselves out of touch and not up to the job of moving the world
closer to where it needs to go. It may also be the case that, upon further reflection, Parties
and others will conclude that the issues with COPs are more political than institutional
and that, in the absence of a significant increase in political will to tackle climate change,
the effectiveness of the COP will have its limits.
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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